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A B S T R A C T   
Integrated assessment models (IAM) and resulting scenarios have become increasingly institutionalised and 
relevant in the science-policy interface of climate policy. Despite their analytical strengths to conceive low- 
carbon futures, their co-evolution with the transnational science-policy interface of climate politics has also 
led to a focus on a specific set of techno-economic futures that are typically based on a relatively narrow set of 
assumptions. This deviates attention from alternatives that are hardly studied by IAMs, but might be more 
desirable from a societal perspective. We argue that research-based models and scenarios should support rather 
than narrow down deliberations on possible and desirable futures and provide an impetus to enact socially 
desirable change. Accordingly, we propose three future directions regarding the development and use of IAMs: 1) 
incorporate a plurality of perspectives on plausibility and desirability through iterative participatory engagement 
and worldview-based scenario exploration, 2) seek collaboration with the arts and humanities to expand the 
range of imagined futures beyond the status quo and 3) make projected futures more tangible and experiential so 
that diverse societal actor groups can understand and genuinely engage with them. By deploying the indisputable 
analytical strengths of IAMs optimally within these suggestions, we believe they can facilitate broader societal 
debates about transformative pathways to low-carbon futures.   
1. Introduction 
As the ecological crises become increasingly manifest, imagining 
plausible and desirable futures and ways to get there is a key task of 
sustainability research [1]. In the climate-energy nexus, scenarios 
developed by Integrated Assessment Models (IAM) play a critical role. 
‘IAM’ is an umbrella term describing a diverse set of global models that 
are used to inform climate policy-making. Based on projected long-term 
interactions between the economy, the environment, technologies, and 
society, IAMs and their resulting scenarios outline different pathways of 
how the future might evolve. Because of this unique capability of con-
necting societal and biophysical processes, IAMs provide insights on the 
order of magnitude of the climate problem as well as the systematic 
exploration of costs and effectiveness of various mitigation strategies in 
relation to policy targets, including the goals stipulated in the 2015 Paris 
agreement [2-4]. As such, IAMs provide various policy-relevant insights. 
The relevance of IAMs is prominently exemplified by their use in reports 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Over the past 
decades, IAMs have co-evolved with the climate policy agenda and 
adopted various roles towards policy-making [5]. This co-evolution 
highlights that the proliferation of model-based scenarios by research 
communities is influenced by and dependent on policymakers who 
eventually use the scenarios to develop mitigation strategies [6-8]. 
However, a potential risk of this close interaction between IAMs and 
climate policy-making is that policy deliberations on future climate 
action become narrowed to the options studied in IAM scenarios [9,10]. 
For instance, most IAM scenarios assume high levels of negative emis-
sions technologies (NETs), which may influence political deliberations 
towards future technologies that may, in the end, not deliver on their 
promise [7]. Accordingly, there is an increasing awareness of how 
model-based insights influence the science-policy interface and how 
policymakers influence the modelling process [11]. A risk is that the key 
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assumptions shaping model-based insights become implicitly accepted 
without necessarily being recognised for their importance by policy-
makers and other IAM users. In addition, the interdependencies between 
policymakers and modelling communities are a challenge for more 
fundamental discussions about assumptions. Meaningful reflections 
about assumptions and their implications for modelling results will 
likely depend on the inclusion of a more diverse set of stakeholders 
which are not part of the existing science-policy interface with its pre- 
defined role of IAMs. Clearly, some elements are easier to include in 
models, including economic and technological aspects, leading to a 
focus on these elements and potentially underestimating the radical 
societal transformations that may be necessary to address the climate 
crisis (see Anderson in [12]). Examples of solutions hardly studied by 
IAMs include lifestyle change [13,14], degrowth [15], near 100% 
renewable energy systems [16], or revolutionary technology solutions 
such as solar radiation management and direct-air-capture [17,18]. In 
fact, assumptions on renewables are often criticized as being conserva-
tive. As such, predominantly using IAMs for policy advice risks confining 
the view on what constitutes possible and desirable ways to respond to 
the climate crisis [13,14,19]. An enhanced interdisciplinary exchange 
between global climate change science and social science disciplines is 
suggested as a potential alternative strategy [20]. While such efforts to 
bridge disciplinary boundaries should be encouraged, in this perspective 
paper, we provide additional ways to open up towards considering a 
more comprehensive range of plausible and desirable low-carbon 
futures. 
Climate change has moved from the institutional confines of global 
environmental politics towards one of the most urgent and important 
contemporary societal debates. Beyond a more comprehensive repre-
sentation of societal transformations in models and scenarios, we suggest 
a reconsideration of the use of IAMs concerning societal deliberations on 
plausible and desirable futures. Since such deliberations are inherently 
value-laden and political, we argue that conforming to their identities of 
objective and value-neutral science may not be the most valuable role 
for science to play [21]. Our argument is not that IAMs are irrelevant or 
the ‘wrong tool for the job’ (see Anderson in [12]), but that their co- 
evolution with the climate policy agenda may have hampered their 
unique ability to enable evidence-based discussions about alternative 
transition pathways. As such, we propose a shift in how models and 
scenarios are developed and how potential users are integrated to make 
them even more helpful for supporting deliberations on plausible and 
desirable futures. 
2. On the use of IAMs to explore possible low-carbon futures 
This section describes how IAMs are currently used and elaborates on 
the intensifying debates following from these contemporary practices. A 
key distinction with regards to IAMs that is often made by the com-
munity itself is between cost-benefit IAMs (CBA IAMs) and detailed 
process-based IAMs (DP IAMs) [4,22]. CBA IAMs are highly aggregated 
models with several comparatively simple equations that are typically 
used to identify optimal mitigation levels and weigh the costs and 
benefits of climate policies (Ibid.). DP IAMs, by contrast, usually entail a 
far more detailed representation of the human and earth systems and are 
designed to identify cost-effective mitigation pathways to meet a 
particular policy goal, such as a specific level of carbon emissions con-
centration or global temperature (Ibid.). Differentiating their respective 
structure and aims is essential but often neglected by critics discussing 
the strengths and caveats of IAM, leading to unconstructive and 
confusing debates. When we use ‘IAMs’ in the following paragraphs, we 
primarily refer to DP IAMs, since those are typically used to explore 
different possible low-carbon futures. The debate on the use of IAMs to 
explore possible low-carbon futures can be roughly divided into dis-
cussions regarding 1) the model structure, 2) assumptions made by 
modellers when constructing scenarios and 3) their use and political 
implications, all of which are interrelated. This section provides a 
stylized synopsis of the debate across those three dimensions, which 
provides the necessary background to elaborate on possible ways to 
‘open up’ the IAM practice. 
Concerning model structure, an important analytical strength of 
IAMs is their representation of both drivers and impacts of climate 
change and a broad consideration of different sectors [23]. This allows 
policy-makers to understand the magnitude of the climate problem, the 
speed of necessary emissions reductions to achieve a specified climate 
target and compare potential climate policies and their associated trade- 
offs. However, some IAMs assume that actors have complete informa-
tion, perfect foresight (see [24] for a discussion) and are incentivised 
merely by price developments. Therefore, critics argue that IAMs neglect 
the heterogeneity of actors and their diverse beliefs, interests and mo-
tivations, as well as the various forms of agency and societal organiza-
tion underlying low-carbon transformations [25–27,128]. This critique 
ranges from more specific caveats regarding the heterogeneity in 
behaviour of actors and political and institutional processes [25] to 
more general criticism that IAMs are limited in their capacity to incor-
porate non-quantifiable change that may be crucial to transform to-
wards a low-carbon society [27], which is something modellers typically 
try to capture in qualitative storylines (see next paragraph). Modellers 
themselves are reflective of these caveats and identify ways to improve 
the heterogeneity within modelling frameworks (see e.g. Keppo et al. 
[28]). Improved representations of demand-side mitigation such as 
lifestyle changes [13,14] and heterogeneity of different consumer 
groups [29] are critical examples of this community effort. Others crit-
icize IAMs for their limited conception of the desirability of possible 
futures: models tend to focus on the most cost-effective pathway towards 
a specified goal, although arguably under a range of assumptions and 
conditions. IAMs tend to focus on the techno-economic feasibility of 
policy options, which is usually strongly related to model solvability, 
with critics arguing that this disregards other dimensions of feasibility 
[30,31]. 
Concerning scenario assumptions, IAM modellers use a comprehen-
sive scenario framework enabling a systematic exploration of possible 
future trajectories across different assumptions and models. The so- 
called shared socio-economic pathways (SSPs) represent five different 
global narratives that differ across key societal developments such as 
population, urbanization, energy use and land use [32]. This allows for 
comparisons between models (particularly the range of possible out-
comes under different normative paradigms, which increases the visi-
bility of different model logics) and provides valuable policy-relevant 
insights, such as the societal conditions under which climate strategies 
may be challenging or effective. Critics argue, however, that this set of 
’plausible’ futures are contingent on the discursive context modellers 
are related to [33], which narrows the range of possible futures down to 
the worldviews of a small number of experts predominantly represent-
ing the Global North [34]. This could be said for many forms of scientific 
inquiry but is critical in the case of IAMs, given their performativity, 
which describes the process through which images of the future shape 
and structure actions in the present. The assumptions shaping what 
plausibility and desirability mean in the context of IAMs neither cover 
all possible technological futures nor are they equitable regarding the 
worldviews they represent. For instance, assumptions around the pace of 
technology development are typically based on past trajectories and 
what modellers assess to be realistic based on the literature [33]. In the 
case of solar PV, this has led to underestimating the expansion of solar 
energy capacity and an overestimation of the costs over the past five 
years [35-38]. In contrast, IAM modellers are also being criticized for 
being too optimistic about technology development, such as for BECCS. 
Another critical assumption made by modellers is the discount rate, 
which affects which mitigation pathways result from modelling exer-
cises [39]. In models, discount rates of 5% are typically used, which is by 
now higher than the social discount rate of several high-income coun-
tries [39,40]. Choosing a discount rate has profound ethical implications 
as it involves value judgments regarding intergenerational justice. To 
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date, these value judgements often remain implicit [41]. In general, 
research has shown that assumptions are not just affected by modellers’ 
worldviews and perspectives but also by their interactions with policy- 
makers [30]. Modellers tend to explore futures within the range of fu-
tures that they assume to be policy-relevant [6,30]. A key example of 
this is that degrowth or post-growth scenarios are largely unexplored 
[42]. Moreover, modellers acknowledge that that the scope and scale of 
behavioural changes in IAM lifestyle scenarios continue to be limited 
[43]. 
Finally, a debate revolves around the use of IAM scenarios and their 
political effects. On the one hand, IAMs have a long tradition of suc-
cessfully answering knowledge demands emerging from the policy 
community [5]. For instance, in the early days of the IPCC, they have 
been pivotal in showing what would happen if emissions continue to rise 
[4] and more recently contributed to the setting of ambitious climate 
policy targets worldwide. Critics argue, however, that IAM pathways 
have become too influential in political discourse: because of the 
authoritative nature of IPCC reports, IAM pathways influence political 
deliberations about possible futures [9,10,44]. Thus, although IAM 
pathways are presented as illustrative ‘what if’ queries, their analytical 
allure lends them to function as powerful visions of the future among 
policy-makers [40,45]. Another debate concerns the use and interpre-
tation of model results. Studies assessing the use of model-based sce-
narios find that they are prone to misinterpretation by actors who are 
not involved in their development process [46,47]. Confusion among 
policy-makers about the meaning of ‘net negative’ vs ‘negative’ emis-
sions [48] and the misinterpretation of IPCC visuals [49,50] illustrate 
this. However, it needs to be stressed that misinterpretation involves not 
only policy-makers but also other potential users, and is at the same time 
not exclusively a challenge for IAMs but rather applies to scientific 
advice and communication in general. For instance, high emission level 
scenarios that were intended to show a risky but highly unlikely future 
are often referred to as ‘a likely future’ in the absence of climate policy in 
media coverage on climate change [51,52]. From a user perspective, 
understanding how model-based insights materialize, what assumptions 
they are contingent on, or what factors were out of scope, is challenging. 
Modellers try to counteract the complexity and limited scope of 
contemporary IAMs through two key approaches. Modellers either strive 
to improve the representation of actors and transition dynamics by 1) 
incorporating insights from socio-technical transition analysis into IAM 
frameworks (integration) or 2) by interdisciplinary exchange with the 
social sciences that inform scenario development (bridging) 
[13,19,43,53-55]. Moreover, although participatory integrated assess-
ment still seems to represent a different category of integrated assess-
ment [56–59], modellers have interacted with policy-makers in an 
iterative way in the past (see, e.g. [60;61]) and there are recent exam-
ples indicating the continuous efforts to involve societal stakeholders in 
scenario development underlying IAM modelling1. Many of these efforts 
often emerged from the storyline-and-simulation (SAS) approach of 
Alcamo [62]. Overall, however, the predominant way of opening up 
seems to be focused on either improving the realism of the models or 
assessing feasibility in follow-up analyses by doing reality checks with 
empirical data or bottom-up studies to ‘overcome barriers’ of imple-
mentation. Both integration and bridging often requires building more 
complex models, which in turn creates further challenges for their 
comprehensibility. Given the urgency of the climate crisis and the 
related need of a range of academic and non-academic actors to make 
evidence-based decisions informed by IAMs, we call for a more funda-
mental shift in the use of IAMs to support deliberations on low-carbon 
futures, on which we elaborate in section 4. 
3. The problem of prematurely closing down possible futures 
without sufficient societal deliberations 
As described in more detail in the previous paragraphs, despite the 
analytical strengths of IAMs, the current way IAMs influence de-
liberations on possible futures may be problematic [7,63-65]. This is 
related to their performativity (the process through which images of the 
future shape and structure actions in the present) [66-69]. The literature 
stream of cience and Technology Studies (STS) has shown that such 
visions and expectations are powerful in legitimizing decisions and 
coordinating actor interests [69-72]. From that perspective, IAMs and 
other forms in which humanity engages with the future can be viewed as 
contested, as prevailing visions and expectations are influential in 
shaping the future [73]. Given their authority in IPCC reports, IAM 
pathways are powerful in bringing certain technologies into the imagi-
nation of policy-makers [10]. A key example of the performative nature 
of IAMs is that they portray large-scale deployment of NETs, most 
notably Bioenergy with CCS (BECCS) in the latter part of the 21st cen-
tury, as the most sensible solutions to climate change. This contributes to 
creating powerful socio-technical imaginaries among policy-makers 
taking off the pressure to consider or promote other potential mitiga-
tion strategies. As such, they are not just portraying possible futures but 
also exercise a ‘world-making’ power in bringing these futures into 
being [44]. This exemplifies that the choices of modelling paradigms 
and economic principles that guide contemporary modelling are not 
value-free. Instead, they simultaneously shape and are shaped by con-
tested and divergent perspectives on how the future could or should look 
like [40]. By interviewing representatives from the modelling commu-
nity, Haikola, Hansson, and Fridahl [74] were able to show that mod-
ellers themselves have different views on the performativity and 
political dimension of models and scenarios, indicating fundamental 
differences in how they reflect on the function and relevance of their 
work. Modellers might be unaware that their scenarios could prema-
turely close down the range of alternative strategies, which risks 
locking-in technologies, infrastructure and policies that are undesirable 
from a societal perspective. Stirling [75] therefore argues there is a need 
for “opening up” deliberations on possible futures in such a way that it 
takes into account context sensitivity, helps to accommodate values and 
interests and ultimately mitigates premature lock-ins. Opening up to-
wards a plurality of actors and possible futures is a necessary condition 
to make the urgently required transformations happen in a democratic 
way. Ideally, long-term decisions are to be decoupled from the power 
asymmetries that characterize the contemporary socio-political systems 
and predominantly take economic considerations into account [76]. 
However, only a subset of alternatives will or can be pursued due to 
biophysical limitations and path-dependencies. Thereby, a form of 
closure at a certain moment in time will be inevitable, regardless of 
whether this process is supported through IAMs or not. We therefore 
align with Stirling [75] in arguing that narrowing down is not neces-
sarily negative. But we believe this task should neither be exclusive to 
modellers, nor to IAMs and their role in the science-policy interface as it 
delimits the deliberation on low-carbon futures to the alternatives that 
the models can capture as well as modellers’ assumptions on plausibil-
ity. Instead, we argue that there is an opportunity for IAMs to play a role 
in supporting societal deliberations on possible future climate actions 
rather than narrowing down towards potentially undesirable 
technologies. 
4. Three ways to use IAMs differently to support more 
transformative deliberations on plausible and desirable futures 
This section provides three interconnected directions for the future 
use of IAMs to better support societal deliberations on low-carbon fu-
tures (see Table 1). The first direction involves better incorporating the 
1 see Schmid and Knopf [126] and Eker et al. [127] for examples of partici-
pation in model-based climate mitigation scenarios, Salter et al. [58] for a re-
view of participatory IA approaches and current efforts of the IAM community 
to engage stakeholders in scenario development such as the SHAPE project http 
://shape-project.org/products. 
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plurality in societal perspectives of plausibility and desirability in sce-
nario construction, which could be achieved through iterative partici-
patory engagement and worldview-based scenario exploration (see 4.1). 
Secondly, we argue for continued inter- and transdisciplinary exchange: 
in addition to collaboration with the social sciences, we propose 
collaboration with the arts and humanities as a promising way to expand 
the range of futures and improve IAMs’ capacity to challenge the status 
quo (4.2). The third direction mainly involves the communication and 
use of scenarios, which we argue could best be achieved by shifting from 
analytical to experiential scenarios (4.3). 
4.1. Incorporating plurality of perspectives on plausibility and desirability 
through iterative participatory engagement and worldview-based scenario 
exploration 
As discussed in section 2, due to IAMs’ structure and modellers’ as-
sumptions, such as their focus on cost-effectiveness, misalignments be-
tween model-based pathways and citizen perspectives on desirable 
mitigation pathways have been identified, for example in the case of the 
future Swiss energy mix [77,78]. Moreover, as the response to climate 
change will involve major reconfigurations of technologies, but also 
behavioural aspects, norms and values, the cost-effectiveness of tech-
nologies should not be the only basis for evidence-based decisions. In 
addition, the manifold (and thus appealing to different values and po-
litical views) implications the corresponding energy system configura-
tions would have for different societal groups and their living conditions 
thus often remain unexplored, even though they have significant effects 
on the acceptability of transitions [79]. The IAM community has dealt 
with the plurality of societal perspectives on futures through qualitative 
storylines that represent by different demographic, social, environ-
mental and economic developments, such as the SRES scenarios [80] 
and more recently the SSP scenario framework [32]. As previously 
indicated in section 2, if the community engages with stakeholders in 
producing scenarios, it mostly concerns policy-makers. In addition to 
storylines, the community has also experimented with incorporating 
different values into modelling paradigms. Based on the cultural theory 
of risk, this so-called ‘Tool to Assess Regional and Global Environmental 
Health Targets for Sustainability’ (TARGETS) modelled different 
possible pathways based on cultural values with regard to human-nature 
relationships [81]. This initiative was criticized within the IAM com-
munity for arbitrarily bringing in insights from other disciplines into a 
modelling framework in a non-critical way, assuming those worldviews 
to be universal [82]. In that regard, the ‘missing pathways to 1.5 ◦C 
report’ by the Climate Land Ambition and Rights Alliance [83] presents 
pathways utilizing natural ecosystem management and agricultural 
practices that are equally focusing on indigenous and community land 
rights. Starting from an analysis on the relationship between energy 
consumption and well-being, Millward-Hopkins et al. [84] develop a 
bottom-up model to estimate the minimal final energy consumption 
threshold that would provide decent living conditions for the entire 
global population. While such approaches may seem extreme or un-
usually specific, one needs to acknowledge that this characterizes most 
of the existing pathways presenting ambitious emission reductions. 
We propose several ways to further move in the direction of a plu-
rality of desirability considerations when constructing scenarios. First, 
models and scenarios should serve as ‘heuristic guides’ [85] rather than 
rational consequences of objective choices, providing opportunities for 
value-oriented debates about the low-carbon future. One way to make 
such assumptions explicit is by deliberately exploring scenarios that 
differ in values and worldviews [86-88]. Rather than reflecting ‘objec-
tive’ challenges to mitigation and adaptation, which are the current key 
dimensions underlying the SSP scenario framework, this would enable a 
more interactive and critical handling of assumptions that are nowadays 
often uncontested once they are accepted among the relevant modelling 
circles. Costanza [86], for instance, experimented with scenario heu-
ristics along contrasting worldviews such as techno-optimists vs. techno- 
sceptics to explore how a shared vision of a sustainable and desirable 
society can be created. Another way to bring in a larger diversity of 
worldviews could therefore be to initially explore existing worldviews 
underlying desirable low-carbon futures across societies, for instance, 
through citizen workshops or studying public discourse and use this as 
an input for model-based scenarios. Instead of basing the exploration of 
worldviews on theoretical insights such as the cultural theory of risk, 
which was the case of the TARGETS model, such an exploration would 
more directly connect to worldviews, perspectives, and beliefs in soci-
eties. For such approaches, transdisciplinary research (in the sense of 
[89]) functioning as an intermediary between modellers and societal 
stakeholders could be helpful. 
A second way to improve the plurality of desirability and plausibility 
considerations could be to use IAM scenarios as an element in deliber-
ative and iterative processes together with societal actors. Although IAM 
modellers describe their models as learning tools rather than ‘truth 
machines’, they are not always perceived as such [90]. The goal of these 
participatory exercises should, however, not be to merely validate 
modelling frameworks or add social-scientific input variables, but to 
employ IAMs as boundary objects that can be used as tools to co- 
generate, integrate and adapt knowledge [91-94]. The method 
referred to as the ‘Future Clinique’ [95] as a metaphor for a challenge 
(“disease”) that institutions or society (“the patient”) needs to act upon 
(“diagnose” and “treat”) could be a useful template for a future- 
orientated stakeholder integration process. The ‘Future Clinique’ is 
particularly useful to detach participants from conventional thinking 
and instead encouraging creative and radical thinking about futures, 
thereby identifying preferable pathways. A reflective and iterative 
interaction between modellers and potential user groups would ensure 
that the analytical strengths and quantitative benefits associated with 
modelling are actually enabling societal debates about the energy future 
that ultimately lead to decisions that are in-line with model-based in-
sights [65,96]. Some scholars argue that value-laden assumptions are 
built in IAM code or modelling frameworks, limiting their ability in 
participatory settings [97,98]. There are, however, examples showing 
that if the problem framing and subsequent co-creation steps are con-
ducted in a truly transparent and open-ended fashion, modelling does 
not necessarily need to constrain participatory processes [99]. Going 
forward, rather than exploring comprehensive and difficult to interpret 
pathways towards the 1.5 ◦C, IAMs could be used to explore a range of 
much simpler ‘what ifs’, enabling not only a widening of the scope but 
also the integration of stakeholders with more diverse backgrounds. For 
example, while IAMs have varying and nuanced assumptions about the 
diffusion of electric vehicles under different scenarios, modal shifts are 
Table 1 
Summary of three future directions to open-up IAM perspectives.  
Three directions Examples 
1 Incorporating a plurality of 
societal perspectives on low- 
carbon futures  
▪ Worldview-based scenarios: e.g. 
techno-optimist vs. techno- 
pessimist scenarios [84]  
▪ Future-Clinique approach to 
exploring low-carbon futures [93]  
▪ Simple and understandable ‘what 
if’ scenarios 
2 Collaboration with the arts & 
humanities to expand the range 
of imagined futures  
▪ Art-science residency network to 
cogenerate future narratives: 
Scenarios project by Tysczuk and 
Smith [115] Using climate fiction 
as resources to identify radical 
alternatives to the IAM scenario 
framework: Nikoleris et al. [108] 
3 From analytical to experiential 
scenarios  
▪ ‘Energetic Odyssey’: experiential 
scenario of renewable energy in 
North Sea [125]  
▪ ‘Earth Remembers’: role-play 
simulation game about climate 
tipping points  
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usually out of scope. If Copenhagen and Amsterdam had adhered to 
predictions of ever-increasing mobility needs that can only be satisfied 
by cars in the 1970 s, they would be unrecognisable from today’s role 
model as walking and cycling-friendly cities, effectively providing a 
possible ‘imaginary’ of an alternative yet possible world, open for other 
cities to follow [100-102]. IAMs could help quantifying what the net 
effects of a widespread dissemination of such an emerging bottom up 
strategy could mean for global greenhouse gas emissions. Other already 
existing but largely unexplored examples that could be investigated are 
what happens if the circular economy becomes successful, if environ-
mental impact is directly translated into product prices or if vegetarian 
and vegan diets become mainstream. IAMs could further explore the 
scalability, interdependencies and effects of many more niche de-
velopments and actor strategies. 
4.2. Seek collaboration with the arts and humanities to expand the range 
of imagined futures beyond the status quo 
According to Meadows [103], the most fundamental leverage points 
for systemic changes are changing the mindsets and paradigms out of 
which the systems arise. However, IAMs currently face challenges to 
propose radically alternative mindsets and paradigms, such as continued 
economic growth. We therefore argue that IAMs should expand their 
scope towards deeper level paradigmatic societal changes that are 
necessary to respond to the climate crisis. This is also what the ‘World 3′
model simulations in the Limits to Growth [104] report, one of the 
forerunners of contemporary IAMs, have done. The simulations caused a 
dramatic paradigm change in pre-existing ideas of endless growth, 
which was foundational to global environmental awareness. Although 
IAMs could theoretically explore such fundamental shifts, degrowth or 
post-growth scenarios are currently not part of their scenario space 
(SSPs). A new role for IAMs could therefore be to explore what realistic 
alternatives to the status quo could look like. A recent example of such 
an exercise is the ‘Societal Transition Scenario’ that was developed by 
the Heinrich Boell foundation, which presented what a 1.5 ◦C degree 
world could look like, characterized by human needs, solidarity and 
cooperation [105], using the Global Calculator to perform their calcu-
lation. As an alternative to assuming high levels of NETs that charac-
terize typical IAM analyses, their 1.5 ◦C scenario is characterized by 
lower consumption rates while fostering welfare, for instance, by means 
of reduced working hours, basic income, sharing rather than owning, 
reducing advertisement, decentralized renewable energy and sustain-
able agriculture practices. 
Collaboration with the social sciences has been proposed as a way to 
expand the range of futures explored with IAMs [23,53,54]. We propose 
collaboration with the arts and humanities as an additional avenue to 
explore, since imagining low-carbon futures involves not just exploring 
technological and economic developments but transformations in our 
current beliefs and values as well [20,27,106,107]. Rather than a ‘late 
phase communication device’ of technical assessments [116], the arts 
and humanities have the capacity to explore futures beyond the quan-
titative conceptions of IAMs and to conceive of cultural changes neces-
sary for humanity to respond to the climate crisis. In other words, 
instead of communicating IAM scenarios differently, a more meaningful 
collaboration with the arts and humanities could expand the scope of 
possible futures that are usually explored with IAMs. 
The arts and humanities could not only assist in providing elabora-
tions on the intent of technology choices and behavioural changes whose 
consequences are typically explored in models, but also help to imagine 
alternatives to the most fundamental societal, economic and political 
structures. Because models and what they can represent through equa-
tions are calibrated against experiences of existing systems, modelling 
generally gets increasingly difficult the further away from the status quo 
the changes are. Against this background, the collaboration with the arts 
and humanities is interesting as it could provide possible narratives for 
these changes that can subsequently be translated and adopted by 
models. Models, in turn, can capture, quantify, and visualize the con-
sequences of these changes. As such, involving the arts and humanities 
in scenario development can help to enrich the solution space. We 
provide three examples of a potential ‘interface’ between IAMs and the 
arts and humanities, focusing mostly on fictional narratives to explore 
what such a collaboration could entail. First, existing cultural work on 
climate futures, such as literary fiction and film, could be used as re-
sources to reveal insights into possible low-carbon futures [108-111]. 
Concerning the temporality of transitions, the uniformity with which 
IAMs resort towards linear changes and gradualism in transitions needs 
to be challenged [112,113]. Also events of disruption (especially in case 
it is emerging uncoordinatedly) and the challenges and opportunities 
following them are rarely taken into account [114]. For instance, 
Nikoleris et al. [108] analysed climate fiction novels and identified a 
number of radical alternatives to current societal organization, alter-
natives to the ‘smooth’ transitions and identifying new drivers of change 
or solution alternatives that were not yet part of the IAM scenario space. 
Second, IAM modelers could more closely work together with artists to 
develop interventions that incorporate the combined deployment of 
modelling and art to stage public conversations on low-carbon futures. 
An example of such a collaboration is the Scenarios project, a science-art 
residency network initiated by Tyszczuk and Smith [115] which 
engaged researchers and artist in experimental encounters. A third 
example could be to use model-based scenarios as input for fictional 
narratives in order to reveal details on what such scenarios would mean 
for different actors across society and how they would deal with 
changing living conditions [116]. This could help reflect on the plausi-
bility and desirability of assumptions in IAM scenarios as well as to 
better support public deliberations on low-carbon futures as it better 
connects with the daily experience of citizens. 
While such analyses may seem peculiar or unrealistic, we need to be 
aware that the origins of scenario planning are essentially seen as a re-
action to the failure of predictive methods. In fact, scenario making was 
traditionally at the heart of the arts and humanities [115]). Challenging 
status quo and counteracting the narrowing and standardization of 
conceivable futures is a necessity if we take the urgency and scope of 
necessary transformations seriously. Although modellers repeatedly 
emphasize their scenarios are merely illustrative and their practice 
should be conceived as ‘map-making’ (showing how pathways may 
unfold given certain conditions, see [117]), they still ‘determine what is 
on the map’ and thereby which futures are conceivable or not. A 
collaboration with the arts and humanities could thus deviate from the 
existing ‘map’ and unsettle rather than respond to policy discourses. 
Ultimately, the true uncertainty associated with the distant future de-
mands that all dimensions and aspects represented by IAMs start to be 
diversified. Furthermore, we hope that by specifying a potential 
collaboration with the arts and humanities, which as a discipline are 
often assumed to be at the opposite end of the scientific spectrum 
compared to IAMs, the untapped collaboration potential for a range of 
other disciplines, whose synergies with IAMs can be imagined more 
easily, are hereby exemplified. 
4.3. From analytical to ‘experiential’ scenarios: making possible futures 
more tangible 
IAMs characterise an analytical and quantitative approach towards 
representing plausible futures. Much of the appeal of models is based on 
the belief that they are able to assess interactions in the climate-energy- 
society nexus systematically, which is often symbolized by a ‘trust in 
numbers’ ascribed to models and scenarios [5,118]. It is thus only 
logical that IAMs typically only have weak connection to qualitative 
elements such as storylines or visualisations. More elements that outline 
how futures projected by models would actually look like are nonethe-
less needed to make them comprehensible and tangible. We therefore 
argue there is a need to move from the ‘analytical’ mode of exploring 
futures that characterizes the current IAM practice towards a more 
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‘experiential’ mode, involving a more visceral, interactive and embodied 
engagement with possible futures [119]. As argued by Candy [120], 
experiential scenarios involve interventions that ‘exploit the continuum of 
human experience, the full array of sensory and semiotic vectors, in order to 
enable a different and deeper engagement in thought and discussion about 
futures, than has traditionally been possible through textual and statistical 
means’ (p. 3). Given the need to move from the science-policy to the 
science-society interface, this would allow citizens to understand and 
deliberate better as it allows for a certain familiarity with everyday re-
ality [121]. A number of scholars have been experimenting with expe-
riential scenarios and repeatedly find that such efforts are effective in 
engaging their audiences more viscerally into futures and stimulate 
deeper level debates on plausible and desirable futures [119,122]. 
In order to strengthen their connection to society, a combination of 
IAMs with more qualitative and experiential approaches could be a 
valuable area to explore, such as storytelling, visioning, speculative 
design and gaming [106]. Ideally, in a combined effort of IAMs with 
alternative approaches the analytical qualities of IAMs, such as their 
representation of complex global level interactions and credibility of 
quantitative information, will be maintained while optimally using the 
strengths of alternative approaches, such as qualitative, socio-cultural 
societal changes and experiential engagement. An example is the ’En-
ergetic Odyssey’ by Hajer and Pelzer [123], which transformed an 
existing energy back-casting study into an immersive installation 
showcasing the potential of wind energy in the North Sea. In this case, 
the experiential future was based on the numbers of the ‘Renewable 
Europe’ scenario [124]. Spatial resolution is not a prerequisite, how-
ever, to make IAM scenarios more experiential. An example is the 
interactive art installation The Prism of Possibility2, which involved a 
dome reflecting different RCPs inviting citizens to imagine the conse-
quences of each scenario through visual cues and audio. With regard to 
games, an example is Earth Remembers3, a role-play simulation game 
developed by researchers at Purdue University, which engaged climate 
negotiators in possible climate tipping point futures, which involved a 
simplified IAM to simulate feedbacks of gameplay. Other examples that 
did not involve IAMs but are relevant examples of experiential scenarios 
are ‘Social practice imaginaries’, as exemplified by combining smart 
home automation with pet care practices [125], which can be used to 
project scenarios that are grounded in relatable everyday life changes 
and an immersive soundscape involving inviting participants to reflect 
on deeply held beliefs on sustainability [122]. A higher visibility of how 
monumental decisions taken today to address sustainability issues shape 
the future will in turn also contribute to answering the question in what 
way IAMs could be connected to societal deliberations of opening up and 
closing down the future. 
If we fail to combine insights provided by IAMs with such qualitative, 
interactive and visceral futures approaches, we miss out on the most 
powerful resources to engage people on an emotional level, shift their 
perception on a particular issue or even worldview as well as allowing 
for democratic exploration of possible futures allowing them to 
comprehend and take part in the imagination of possible futures. 
Moreover, the analytical facets of IAMs leave significant degrees of 
interpretative flexibility as it operates with a range of aggregated 
assessment metrics, which limits their accessibility and provides little 
common ground among actor groups. To make sustainability futures less 
abstract and more accessible, model-based insights needs to be trans-
ferred and translated to a broad range of interdisciplinary and trans-
disciplinary products, tools and practices. 
As illustrated in Fig. 1, the three directions presented in this 
perspective are interrelated and have the potential to strengthen each 
other. For instance, an increased collaboration with the arts and hu-
manities could not just expand the range of futures explored by IAMs 
and challenge the status quo (section 4.2), but also ‘bring to life’ the 
imagined futures to connect better with people’s daily experience, for 
instance by collaborating with artists, and thereby also enable the 
engagement of a wider range of societal actors (section 4.3). In addition, 
challenging the status quo (section 4.2) may also be achieved by 
engaging wider societal actors and their plurality of worldviews early on 
in scenario exercises (section 4.1). Moreover, engaging a wider range of 
societal stakeholders in scenario development (section 4.1) arguably 
requires modellers to engage actors beyond merely statistics, but in 
more experiential forms of engagement (section 4.3). As such, experi-
ential scenarios may not just involve a different mode of communica-
tion, but engaging actors early in participatory processes in a more 
experiential way. 
5. Conclusion 
The alternative futures that can be analysed and depicted by models 
and scenarios should provide an impetus to imagine and ultimately 
enact socially desirable change. In reality, however, many contemporary 
research efforts to open up towards a wider range of futures fall short by 
remaining incremental compared to the scope and scale of necessary 
transformative change or failing to meaningfully engage societal actors 
in the imagination of plausible and desirable low-carbon futures. In this 
perspective, we presented three main directions to open-up the IAM 
practice, focusing on iterative participatory engagement, collaboration 
with the arts and humanities and experiential scenarios. While we show 
that there exist small-scale examples for the propositions we put for-
ward, what is lacking is a broader commitment by modelling commu-
nities and an increased legitimacy for such approaches in science-policy 
interfaces, which are interrelated. We emphasize that these directions 
not only require openness from modellers to reflect upon their ap-
proaches and role as researchers, they also need to be supported by 
inter- and transdisciplinary research to expand the focus of models from 
the science-policy to the science-society interface. Rather than arguing 
IAMs are the ‘wrong tool for the job’, we believe IAMs have the ability 
and authority to contribute to reflexive and iterative learning processes 
that allow for integrating diverse futures approaches and acknowledge a 
plurality of perspectives and actors, which are at the same time in 
accordance with scientific principles. But for that, all actors involved in 
shaping the IAM practice have a responsibility to support rather than 
narrow down deliberations on plausible and desirable low-carbon 
futures. 
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